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Abstract 
In many nations today the state has little capability to carry out even basic functions like 
security, policing, regulation or core service delivery. Enhancing this capability, 
especially in fragile states, is a long-term task. Countries like Haiti or Liberia will take 
many decades to reach even a moderate capability country like India, and millennia to 
reach the capability of Singapore. Short-term programmatic efforts to build 
administrative capability in these countries are thus unlikely to be able to …/ 
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… demonstrate actual success, yet billions of dollars continue to be spent on such 
activities. What techniques enable states to ‘buy time’ to enable reforms to work, to 
mask non-accomplishment, or to actively resist or deflect the internal and external 
pressures for improvement? How do donor and recipient countries manage to engage in 
the logics of ‘development’ for so long and yet consistently acquire so little 
administrative capability? We document two such techniques: (a) systemic isomorphic 
mimicry, wherein the outward forms (appearances, structures) of functional states and 
organizations elsewhere are adopted to camouflage a persistent lack of function; and (b) 
premature load bearing, in which indigenous learning, the legitimacy of change and the 
support of key political constituencies are undercut by the routine placement of highly 
unrealistic expectations on fledging systems. We conclude with some suggestions for 
sabotaging these techniques. 
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1 Introduction 
Successful implementation of most governmental endeavours requires capable 
organizations that induce and support productive day-to-day practices by large numbers 
of individuals: teachers must teach, policemen must police, engineers must engineer, 
regulators must regulate, tax collectors must collect taxes. The expansion of state 
capability through the creation and promotion of efficacy in public sector organizations 
is one component of the historical ‘modernization’ of nation-states (Bayly 2004; Lindert 
2004). State administrative capability for implementation is a distinct component of any 
definition of national development. 
But the weak implementation capability of the organizations of the state in developing 
countries manifests itself at the micro level in many ways: ubiquitous corruption of state 
officials, large gaps between the law and actual practice in business regulation, workers 
who do not even show up, doctors that do not doctor, teachers who do not teach. This 
weak implementation capacity affects outputs and outcomes in areas as diverse as 
public sector budgeting and procurement to justice systems and education. 
Consequently, as we show below, cross-national measures of state capability in 
components of ‘governance’ indices show many countries with levels of capability that 
are both absolutely very low and progressing very slowly.1 Short-term programmatic 
efforts to build administrative capability in these countries are thus unlikely to be able to 
demonstrate actual success, yet billions of dollars continue to be spent on such 
activities. What techniques enable states to ‘buy time’ to enable reforms to work, to 
mask non-accomplishment, or to actively resist or deflect the internal and external 
pressures for improvement? How do donor and recipient countries manage to engage in 
the logics of ‘development’ for so long and yet consistently acquire so little 
administrative capability? 
We answer these questions in five sections. Following this introduction, Section 2 
frames the development process as transformation across four dimensions: the polity, 
the economy, social relations, and public administration. Explicitly eschewing the 
assumptions and Hegelian teleology of classic modernization theory, our concern, 
rather, is with enhancing functionality (or performance levels) pragmatically, achieving 
it via whatever means enjoys domestic political legitimacy and cultural resonance in the 
contexts wherein such change is being undertaken. We distinguish between institutional 
form (what institutions ‘look like’) and function (what they actually ‘do’), and argue 
that their conflation has been one of the most ubiquitous but pernicious mistakes of 
development policy over the last sixty years, and is manifest most clearly in widespread 
implementation failure. The nature and extent of this failure is documented empirically 
in Section 3. 
 
Section 4 outlines an explanatory framework comprising agents,  organizations and 
systems, in which systems can create incentives for organizations and agents (leaders 
and front-line workers) to engage in isomorphic mimicry—that is, adopting the 
camouflage of organizational forms that are deemed successful elsewhere to hide their 
                                                 
 
1  See also Pritchett et al. (2010), Pritchett and de Weijer (2010), and the broader discussion in World 
Bank (2011).  
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actual dysfunction. When isomorphic mimicry is a sustainable, if not optimal, 
organizational strategy it can result in what we call a ‘capability trap’, in which the 
appearance of development activity masks the lack of functional development activity. 
Such a trap emerges when agents of development inadvertently promote and solidify 
isomorphic mimicry by rewarding organizations that adopt ‘modern’ or ‘best practice’ 
forms or notional policies, even when these are not followed up by, or are even 
consistent with, actual functional performance in the context of a given organization’s 
actual capability for policy implementation. These carbon-copy organizations are then 
asked to perform tasks that are too complex and too burdensome, too soon and too 
often, a process we call premature load bearing.  
 
In Section 5 we conclude by integrating the analytics and the empirics to lay out a 
research agenda for exploring alternative strategies for unblocking capability traps, and 
its implications for guiding the actions of development agents and organizations, 
elements of which are often the very opposite of the current systemic arrangement.  
2  What is development? Four great transformations in the functional space 
In order to better understand and respond to implementation failure, it is instructive to 
start with a big-picture summary of what we think most people believe ‘development’ to 
be, and on this basis consider the broad avenues of actions pursued to bring it about.  
When people speak of the ‘development’ of societies2 most people refer, implicitly or 
explicitly, to a cumulative historical process whereby economies grow through 
enhanced productivity,3 prevailing political systems represent the aggregate preferences 
of citizens,4 rights and opportunities are extended to all social groups,5 and 
organizations function according to meritocratic standards and professional norms 
                                                 
 
2  There is a fundamental distinction between ‘development’ as the improved well-being of the 
individuals in a given society and ‘development’ as a process affecting ‘societies’ and/or nation states. 
Debates abound about the appropriate normative criteria to be used in evaluating the well-being of 
individuals (e.g., the role of individual income versus other sources of well-being or philosophical 
debates about individual utility versus broader metrics), and hence how one should assess the well-
being of the citizens/residents of a given region. But this is ontologically distinct from the notion of 
‘development’ in which the entity experiencing the development is not an individual but instead a 
society. Normatively, one may wish to only privilege one—perhaps human development—and 
evaluate social development only as an ‘input’ to expanded human development, but they are 
nevertheless conceptually different uses of the term ‘development’. 
3  The classic definition here is that of Kuznets (1966), who argued that modern economic growth was a 
product of enhanced productivity (as opposed to, say, rents from natural resource extraction). Thus 
even though Slovenia and Saudi Arabia have roughly comparable levels of per capita wealth, in the 
former it is a product of modern economic growth (‘development’) whereas in the latter it is merely a 
result of exporting oil. 
4  Note that this may or may not manifest itself in a democracy. For our purposes, modern polities are 
polities that reflect the aggregate preferences of the population (whatever those preferences happen to 
be). 
5  That is, rights and opportunities are incrementally afforded to people irrespective of their race, health 
status, ethnicity, gender, religion or other social/demographic category. Thus Saudi Arabia and 
Indonesia, both predominantly Islamic counties, differ with respect to how modern their views are 
regarding the status of women. See also Bayly (2011: 51), who forcefully argues that ‘[f]or 
development to occur people need to have the belief that they can succeed and that their own societies 
are essentially benign’.  
3 
 
(thereby becoming capable of administering larger numbers of more technically and 
logistically complex tasks).6 In and through such processes, a given society undergoes a 
four-fold transformation in its functional capacity to manage its economy, polity, 
society and public administration, becoming, in time, ‘developed’ (see Figure 1).7 When 
in everyday speech people say that France—as an ontologically distinct category and 
not merely as an aggregation of the people living in France—is ‘more developed’ than 
Congo, or Denmark more developed than Nepal they mean, inter alia, that France has 
undergone more of this four-fold functional transformation than the Congo, and 
Denmark than Nepal. Policy implementation failures can of course have multiple 
‘causes’; it is our contention, however, that the modernization of administrative life is a 
key, but often neglected, aspect of the development process in general and policy 
implementation in particular, and is thus the primary focus of our analysis in this paper. 
The overwhelming majority of scholarly and policy attention in development is given to 
the modernization of the economy, polity and society, and to the ex ante design and ex 
post evaluation of policies, yet our collective understanding of the administrative 
dynamics shaping the capability for (and quality of) implementation of these policies is 
conspicuously thin. 
The central premise of the development enterprise is that today’s ‘less’ developed 
countries can, should, and eventually will undergo their own four-fold transformation 
and thereby become ‘more’ developed. The task of the development project and its 
promoters (domestic and foreign) is to accelerate this transformation, to ‘speed up’ a 
process that, left to its own devices, would occur, but too slowly or haphazardly. 
Development agencies, for instance, are structured on the premise that how these 
transformations unfold is known (or at least knowable)—that is, they believe, though 
they may not explicitly articulate it in such terms, that there is a common underlying 
structure characterizing these transformations—and that as such their primary objective 
is to facilitate (via the deployment of their resources and staff through instruments 
known as ‘projects’) this ongoing transformational process, the better to bring it about 
in a faster and/or more equitable manner. As befits a system believed to have oversight 
over a common underlying structure, professional skills acquired in a given 
development sector and setting (say, agricultural extension in Pakistan) are non-
problematically regarded as being readily transferable to another (social development in 
Egypt). The common, if completely hidden, foundation to development agents, 
                                                 
 
6  So understood, most of the vociferous critics of ‘development’ raise objections to the means by which 
(and/or through whom) it is brought about, not the ends as articulated here. Even when criticizing a 
focus on economic growth, most such critics are not calling for a return to a pre-industrial economy or 
pre-modern health care. 
7  As Figure 1 imperfectly shows, an additional feature of modernity is that it ‘separates’ these four 
realms into discrete entities, requiring people to move between qualitatively different roles as (say) 
consumer, citizen, employee and parishioner. This was the essence of Polanyi’s (1944) classic thesis 
on the ‘great transformation’, in which he argued that, as a result of the development process, ‘the 
economy’ became increasingly dis-embedded from ‘society’ and both thereby became subject to a 
different set of logics, rules, expectations and power relations. In those countries or communities at 
the center of Figure 1 these four realms remain essentially one and the same: religious, political, 
judicial, commercial and civic leadership, for example, is exercised as a single entity. A defining 
feature of modernity, on the other hand, is the separation of church and state, the separation of 
powers, of science and religion, of media and state (a ‘free press’), of knowledge into professional 
‘disciplines’, etc., a process that has usually been accompanied by great conflict.   
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agencies, and agendas is modernization, which, for lack of anything else, everyone still 
relies on as bedrock.  
Figure 1: Development as a four-fold modernization process 
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Source: Authors’ illustration. 
In the last four decades, however, a fundamental paradox has emerged at the heart of 
development theory and practice. The paradox is that everyone and no-one believes in 
modernization. If everybody (explicitly or implicitly) still believes that development 
entails the modernization of economic, political, social and administrative life, no-one 
(for all intents and purposes) now believes modernization theory.8 It was not always 
thus; what gave modernization theory such widespread potency in its prime in the 1950s 
and 1960s was that both the hard right and hard left believed that history was unfolding 
according to some inevitable Hegelian teleology, and that the culmination of this 
process—capitalism (for the right) or communism (for the left)—would be a 
convergence of institutional forms.9 Thus the fastest and most expedient route to 
modernity was to adopt the ‘forms’ of those countries further along this path, and to do 
so via a ‘great push’. But if asked, few contemporary development practitioners would 
espouse this view. Development discourse is now replete with anti-modernization-
                                                 
 
8  The enduring power and resonance of Scott (1998) resides in large part on his documenting of how 
fully, in the middle decades of the twentieth century, both the political left/right and the global 
north/south bought into bureaucratic high-modernism as the preferred ‘scheme’ for ‘improving the 
human condition’. 
9  Hence Frances Fukuyama could declare the ‘end of history’ in 1989 because, with the collapse of 
Communism as a viable alternative economic system and the triumph of (big D) Democracy as a 
political system, history had fulfilled its teleological objectives of converging into the peak forms; all 
that was left was a bit of little h historical tidying up not worthy of a big H transformational effort.  
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theory aphorisms: ‘one size doesn’t fit all,’ ‘there are no silver bullets,’ ‘context 
matters’. Most development professionals are extraordinarily well travelled and are 
acutely conscious of, and actively celebrate, cultural difference. Nearly all would agree 
that low-income countries ‘should be in the driver’s seat’ when it comes to determining 
the content, direction and speed of their development policies, and hence (implicitly) 
reject modernization theory.  
Rejection of modernization theory in principle, however, has not dislodged 
modernization theory in practice, greatly undermining the coherence of efforts to 
enhance implementation effectiveness. For present purposes, we contend that the idea 
of development (as a four-fold modernization process of economy, polity, society and 
administration) and the business of development (as a loosely linked movement/industry 
structured to disseminate standardized solutions) are conjointly underpinned by a theory 
of change that conspires against serious engagement with complex implementation 
issues. This theory of change can be fairly characterized as ‘accelerated modernization 
via transplanted best practice’. In other words, the abiding theory of change that 
underpins the actions of most large development agencies, national and international, is 
one that seeks to modernize institutions by intensifying a process of reform via the 
importing of methods and designs deemed effective elsewhere. Such an approach, we 
should acknowledge, can be entirely appropriate for those development problems that 
do indeed have a universal technical solution, where there genuinely is no need to 
‘reinvent the wheel’. Effective low-cost vaccines should of course be made available to 
all; there are only so many tools for combating hyperinflation. For many central aspects 
of political, administrative and legal reform, however, and for the delivery of key public 
services—especially health and education, which require enormous numbers of 
discretionary face-to-face transactions (Pritchett and Woolcock 2004)—reform via cut-
and-paste borrowings from a foreign setting is no reform at all. In such instances, much 
of the wheel must be reinvented, each and every time. For large development agencies, 
however, organizational imperatives overwhelmingly favour tackling problems, or those 
aspects of problems, that lend themselves to a technical, universal answer. 
Accelerated modernization is the modus operandi of the dominant paradigm we might 
call Big Development. For at least the last four decades, however, a counter-narrative 
has long recognized many of these problems, arguing for similar development 
objectives but seeking to attain them via alternative modalities.10 As the most famous 
expression of this approach puts it, ‘small is beautiful’: the entry point for effective 
development should not be grand plans designed by technocrats in capital cities, but 
local initiatives that tap into context-specific knowledge—what Scott (1998) calls 
‘metis’—and that work incrementally to improve human welfare. For adherents of 
(what we might call) Small Development, a core principle is sustainability, the 
imperative to be able to continue functioning once external support is withdrawn.11 In 
principle, Small Development has much to commend it, but in terms of the framework 
of development outlined above—the four-fold modernization of economic, political, 
social and administrative life—it is hard to argue that it achieves this. Put differently, 
for all the many local successes that can doubtless be attributed to Small Development, 
                                                 
 
10 See Cowen and Shenton (1996) for a broader discussion on the various ‘doctrines of development’ 
that have influenced policy and practice. 
11 On the ubiquity of the ‘sustainability doctrine’ see Swidler and Watkins (2009).  
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few have scaled up to effect systemic change. Famous cases such as Grameen Bank, for 
example, have not fundamentally altered the financial system in Bangladesh, even as 
one can duly recognize the many accomplishments it has achieved for its members (and, 
by extension, for those people elsewhere in the world who have joined similar 
programmes).12 (Alternatively, we could note that Grameen Bank achieves what it does 
precisely because it has figured out, unlike the government, how to run a large, effective 
and dispersed—but ultimately very modern—administrative apparatus to serve the rural 
poor.) We stress here that we are broadly supportive of what many of these types of 
programmes are trying to accomplish; for present purposes, however, where our focus 
in on implementation issues and the emergence of modern institutions, Small 
Development typically falls short in that its net systemic transformational effects are 
often, well, small. 
Both Big and Small Development, then, can do certain things well, but can also be 
complicit in long-run development stagnation. Before proceeding further with the 
analytical framework that underpins our explanation of (and positive response to) 
implementation failure, it is helpful to ground these discussions in concrete cases and 
broader empirical evidence documenting the nature and scale of the challenge.13 
3  Documenting implementation failure: specific and general evidence 
Why do we need a theory of implementation failure? Because although state 
administrative capacity has expanded in some countries, in many others—in spite of 
enormous effort and apparent engagement in ‘reform’—it has not. What does 
implementation failure look like in practice? Consider these three vignettes.  
3.1  Vignettes of implementation reform in practice  
Education in India 
 
In 1996 the Indian activist and economist Jean Drèze led a team of researchers to 
document the conditions of schools in selected states of India and produced the justly 
famous Public Report on Basic Education (PROBE), which documented in detail the 
very sorry state of teaching and learning of government-provided basic education. One 
of the shocking figures to emerge was that, in the rural areas of the states they surveyed, 
absences among teachers were a staggering 48 per cent. In response, the government of 
India in 2001 launched the nationwide Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) programme in 
                                                 
 
12 In this regard Bangladesh is actually an unusual but instructive case in the developing world, since the 
sheer number of Small Development actors (i.e., NGOs) in the context of a highly fragmented and 
compromised state, means that they comprise, in effect, the primary service delivery vehicle for the 
rural poor. The long-run (big D) development objective, however, must be to facilitate the emergence 
of a modern polity and administrative state apparatus capable of delivering on what is its clear 
mandate.  
13 Our approach throughout this paper is in the spirit of several parallel efforts stressing the importance 
of local innovation and context specificity is the design of effective organizations for development. 
See, among others, Rondinelli (1993) on ‘projects as policy experiments’, Grindle (2004, 2010) on 
‘good enough governance’, van de Walle (2007) on ‘paths from neo-patrimonialism’, Rodrik (2008) 
on ‘second-best institutions’, Adler et al. (2009) on the importance of ‘good struggles’ for political 
and legal reform, and Levy and Fukuyama (2010) on ‘just enough governance’.   
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which the central government provided support to states to improve the quality of 
government-produced primary education.  
 
Drawing on the government’s previous experiences with education initiatives and 
world-wide experts, the SSA expanded budgets for schools, infrastructure 
improvements, teacher hiring, teacher training and an array of other pedagogical 
improvements. As enrollments rates increased and many of the quantitative indicators of 
schooling improved, many regarded SSA as a major success. In 2008 PROBE went 
back into the field. They did find higher enrollments and many instances of better 
physical conditions. Their (still very preliminary) finding on teachers absence rates: 48 
per cent. Tracking the learning achievement nationwide, district by district, the ASER 
exercise has found no systematic increases in the actual basic literacy and mathematics 
competencies children possess (ASER 2010). 
 
Public financial management in Mozambique 
 
Mozambique emerged from conflict nearly two decades ago, and has effected far-
reaching changes to its governance systems ever since. The country’s progress is 
impressive, reflected in multiple peaceful elections and transitions in top leadership, for 
example, and reforms to public financial management (PFM) processes that have 
resulted in a system which compares favourably with African peers. Mozambique’s 
PFM system comes out as stronger than all African countries apart from South Africa 
and Mauritius when assessed using the donor-defined criteria of good PFM, the Public 
Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment framework. It has revised 
PFM laws and introduced a state-of-the art information system, e-sistafe, through which 
money now flows more efficiently than ever before. 
 
But there are some problems, as reflected in the PEFA measures and in self-assessments 
by government officials. Budget processes are strong and budget documents are 
exemplary, but execution largely remains a black box. Information about execution 
risks is poor, with deficiencies in internal controls and internal audit and in-year 
monitoring systems, and weak or unheard of reporting from service delivery units and 
the politically powerful, high-spending state owned enterprises. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
there are many questions about the extent and quality of implementation of the new 
laws and systems, and of what really happens in the day-to-day functionality in the PFM 
system. The questions emerge most clearly when considering that PEFA indicators 
reflecting de jure changes in form average a B while PEFA dimensions reflecting de 
facto implementation and functional adjustment average a C. When asked about this, 
officials in line ministries, departments and agencies note that the new laws and systems 
are part of the problem. They may look impressive, but are often poorly fitted to the 
needs of those using them, requiring management capacities they do not have, 
institutionalizing organizational scripts and allocation modalities that reflect 
international best practice but not political and organizational realities on the ground. 
These officials note that they were never asked about the kind of system they needed, 
and while recognizing the impressive nature of the new PFM system they lament the 
missed opportunity to craft a system that works to solve their specific needs (Andrews 
et al. 2010). 
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Legal reform in Melanesia 
 
Practitioners and scholars alike have long recognized that ‘building the rule of law’ is a 
key development objective. After all, as we noted above, a defining feature of modern 
systems is that authority, trade and service delivery are mediated not by the whims of 
powerful individuals, the obligations of kinship or the dictates of custom but impartially 
enforced, universal rules. During the colonial period and thereafter, strategies to 
enhance the quality of legal systems in developing countries—manifest most 
prominently in the ‘law and development’ movement—overtly adopted a strategy of 
accelerated modernization: if modern (Western) legal systems were characterized by 
certain structural features, then the optimal development approach in low-income 
nations was to simply introduce those features. This was certainly the experience in the 
various countries of Melanesia, where ‘[i]n the decades before independence, systems 
of ‘native administration’ began to be replaced by centralized bureaucratic forms of 
governance. Standardized Western models of justice, administration and representation 
were imported for this purpose’ (Dinnen et al. 2010: 3). 
 
To their credit, the early champions of the law and development movement publically 
conceded that their efforts had fallen far short of expectations (Trubeck and Galanter 
1974). A parade of writers since then have also stressed that accelerated modernization 
is an entirely inappropriate strategy for building legitimate, effective legal systems (e.g., 
Haggard et al. 2008). Yet the imperatives to continue adopting this approach are 
resilient, powerful and ubiquitous. For example, in the Solomon Islands, which 
continues to recover from a violent series of ‘tensions’ in the early 2000s, the showcase 
products of a major international assistance mission to restore security and justice are a 
state-of-the-art jail and courthouse, both costing millions of dollars; unfortunately, 
however, the courthouse has been used twice in its first year and the jail has but a 
handful of inmates, while a backlog of 800 cases only rises, magistrates visit 
infrequently and officials are paid as funds are available. These new facilities 
unambiguously look like a modern rule-of-law system; regrettably, they have done little 
to enhance the functionality of the actual justice system. They absorb financial 
resources and professional expertise in seemingly laudable, measurable, attractive ways, 
but barely engage in any substantive sense with the prevailing justice problems that 
most Solomon Islanders encounter most of the time. 
 
What do these three cases in three different countries in three different sectors have in 
common? First, they all deal with functions widely regarded as core government 
responsibilities: governments must assume responsibility for basic education, 
governments must control their budgets and expenditures, governments must sustain 
systems of justice and security; there is no debate about whether governments have 
responsibilities for these tasks.14 Second, they are activities in which success in 
reaching objectives requires not just ‘good policy’ but also transaction intensive policy 
implementation: student learning at a national scale requires millions of effective 
learner-teacher experiences every day; budgetary systems must handle millions of 
individual transactions; disputes over land and inheritance must be adjudicated between 
parties with contrasting claims and sources of evidence. Third, they are all examples of 
                                                 
 
14 Governments, of course, do not necessarily have to provide education (or health care or energy), but 
in virtually all countries they are ultimately responsible for it assuring its provision at some minimal 
and coherent standard.  
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attempts at promoting development through ‘accelerated modernization through 
transplanted best practice’ which is the de facto, if not consciously articulated, 
mainstream strategy of governments, international organizations (e.g., the UN) and all 
major external assistance agencies (both bilateral and multi-lateral).15 
3.2 Cross-national  data 
But of course these are just three vignettes, drawn from examples with which the 
authors have deep familiarity. In companion pieces to the present work (Andrews et al. 
2010; Pritchett and de Weijer 2010) we analyze the available cross-national data on 
functional  state capability (not economic progress, not polity, not social or human 
development indicators) from four different sources. We avoid indicators that build into 
their measure of performance a particular view about the ‘right’ policy or which are 
based on norms about desirable forms of government, but rather focus on subjectively 
assessed performance of overall state capability. The difficulty is to argue for a 
capability ‘trap’ which is explicitly about dynamics when reliable time series on 
indicators are scarce. We address this challenge by using two different methods. 
First, we use three cross national indicators of measures of state capability in 2008. One 
is the 2008 value of the Kaufmann et al. (2009) indicator of ‘Government 
Effectivenesss’ from the World Governance Indicators published by the World Bank. A 
second is the component of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index that measures a 
government’s ‘Resource Efficiency’ which is intended not as whether a government is 
pursuing the ‘right’ policies but by their efficacy in implementation. Finally, from the 
Failed State Index we use just the indicator for ‘progressive deterioration in public 
services’ as a measure of state capability.    
For each of those three indicators we calculate the implied maximum the long-run rate 
of progress in state capability could have been since a given country’s political 
independence simply by calculating the current gap between the country’s measure of 
state capability and no state capability, and then dividing by the number of years since 
independence. This calculation just relies on the notion that the current level is the result 
of the entire historical process and, while the pace could have been positive and then 
negative or very fast then very slow, the average rate of the change of the entire period 
cannot have been faster than the rate that took them from zero to the level they have 
today (it might have been slower if they began at independence with state capability but 
since we are arguing that this pace is slow, our calculation biases the rates against our 
argument). We then calculate how long at that annual pace it would take for the country 
to reach the level of state capability of Singapore. This makes the different indicators 
comparable as we make each scale into Singapore to Somalia units as it does not matter 
whether original rankings were 0 to 1 or 1 to 6 or 1 to 100.16   
                                                 
 
15 We are of course keenly aware that key development indicators such as life expectancy, years of 
schooling and income have risen at historically unprecedented rates for many people in many poor 
countries (see Kenny 2011). Our concern here is with those intentional programmatic efforts to 
enhance human welfare that have clearly and repeatedly failed (in the manner of Scott 1998). 
16 To illustrate the simple calculation, take Myanmar. On the ‘Government Effectiveness’ scale normed 
so that Somalia is a 1 (the minimum) and Singapore is a 10 (the maximum) Myanmar is rated a 2.5 so  
10 
 
Table 1 illustrates what a ‘capability trap’ means—that at their average historical pace it 
would take hundreds, if not thousands, of years for the currently low capability 
countries to reach high capability. For the average of the countries in 2008 in the bottom 
15 it would take 672 years. That’s a long time. For the countries just above those, 
ranked 15th to 30th, it would take over 209 years at their historical pace—roughly since 
US independence—to reach the capability of Singapore. While this is perhaps not 
complete stagnation, neither it is what anyone imagined as ‘accelerated’ modernization.  
Table 1: Years that it would take selected countries to reach high state capability (Singapore’s 
current level) at their estimated rate of progress since political independence 
 
 
Countries 
KKM 
government 
effectiveness 
Bertelsmann 
transformation 
index: resource 
efficiency 
Failed state 
index: 
progressive 
deterioration 
of public 
services 
Average 
of the 
three 
Average bottom 15 
countries in the average 
of the three indicators 
325 488  1204  672 
Average of the countries 
ranked 15th to 30th 
140 181  305  209 
Selected countries 
Afghanistan 834  1501  1931  1,422 
Pakistan 112  104  153  123 
Nepal 159  170  201  177 
Haiti 640  583  4080  1,768 
Bolivia 357  364  513  411 
Nicaragua 384  183  510  359 
Cambodia 108  193  176  159 
Myanmar 302  750  500  517 
Nigeria 111  82  400  198 
Côte d’Ivoire  168  600  164  311 
Sierra Leone  124  134  282  180 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The second method to illustrate a capability trap is to use time series data of measures of 
state capability to assess how long, at the recently observed pace, it would take 
countries to reach high state capability. We use the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) indicators of ‘bureaucratic quality’ and ‘corruption’ as indicators of state 
capability. This data is much clearer about ‘capability traps’ in general because the 
median rate of country improvement for both indicators is zero. Table 2 shows the time 
it would take for the bottom 30 countries to reach Singapore’s level of measured 
bureaucratic quality or lack of corruption at either the countries own measured pace of 
 
                                                                                                                                             
 
the total progress since independence in 1948 is (2.5-1) = 1.5 in sixty years for an annualized rate of 
1.5/60=.025 units per year. Since its current deficit from Singapore is 10-2.5=7.5 it would take 
7.5/.025=300 years to reach Singapore at that pace.   
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Table 2: Years for country to achieve high bureaucratic quality or low corruption (Singapore’s 
level) at either their own observed rate of progress since 1985 or at the average pace of all 
countries 
 
Bureaucratic quality  Lack of corruption 
Worst 30 
countries in 
current level 
At own past 
pace (if 
negative 
then infinity) 
At the average 
pace of 
improvement for 
all countries, 
1985-2009 
Worst 30 
countries in 
current level 
At own past 
pace (if 
negative then 
infinity) 
At the 
average 
pace of 
improvement 
for all 
countries, 
1985-2009 
Côte d’Ivoire  Infinity  503  Zimbabwe  Infinity  Infinity 
North Korea  Infinity  503  Kenya  Infinity  Infinity 
Sierra Leone  Infinity  503  North Korea  Infinity  Infinity 
Somalia Infinity  503  Somalia  Infinity  Infinity 
Togo Infinity  503  Lebanon  Infinity  Infinity 
Zaire Infinity  503  Papua  New 
Guinea 
Infinity Infinity 
Haiti Infinity  503  Venezuela  Infinity  Infinity 
Liberia Infinity 503  Sudan  Infinity  Infinity 
Mali Infinity  503  Paraguay  Infinity  Infinity 
Russia Infinity 377  Haiti  84  Infinity 
Yemen Infinity 377 DRC  65 Infinity 
Burkina Faso  Infinity  377  Iraq  Infinity  Infinity 
 Infinity  377  Albania  Infinity  Infinity 
Madagascar Infinity  377  Algeria  Infinity  Infinity 
Mozambique Infinity  377  Malawi  Infinity  Infinity 
Senegal Infinity  377  Niger Infinity  Infinity 
Venezuela Infinity  377  Libya  Infinity Infinity 
Congo Infinity  377  Ghana  Infinity  Infinity 
Libya Infinity  377  Jamaica  Infinity  Infinity 
Nigeria Infinity 377 Myanmar  Infinity  Infinity 
Nicaragua Infinity  377  Nigeria  Infinity Infinity 
Zambia Infinity 377  Togo Infinity  Infinity 
Myanmar 72  377  Sierra  Leone  Infinity  Infinity 
Paraguay 72  377 Costa  Rica  Infinity  Infinity 
Romania 72  377  Russia  Infinity  Infinity 
Sudan 72  377  Mongolia  Infinity  Infinity 
Tanzania 72  377  Burkina  Faso  Infinity  Infinity 
Gabon Infinity 377  Bulgaria  Infinity  Infinity 
Cameroon Infinity  314  Mozambique  Infinity Infinity 
Niger Infinity  314  Greece  Infinity  Infinity 
Zimbabwe Infinity  314  Yemen  Infinity Infinity 
Source: Authors’ calculations with PRS ICRG data. The ‘bottom 30’ include countries’ ties. 
change or at the country average pace of change. If anything these numbers are more 
striking as nearly all of the bottom 30 countries have had negative rates of change of 
bureaucratic quality and corruption over this whole period and hence the estimated time 
is infinity (it takes forever to get somewhere if you go in the opposite direction). But 
even if the bottom thirty countries by current bureaucratic quality were to improve to 
the average pace of improvement in the countries measured, it would still take hundreds 
of years (since these numbers are discrete the numbers are ‘lumpy’). Since with  
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corruption the average  pace is negative it would take forever at that pace for all 
countries. 
By both of these measures we show that many countries are in what we call a capability 
trap—they have a negative or near zero rate of improvement in state capability such 
that, if they persisted at only their current pace of progress it would take a very, very, 
long time for them to reach high levels of capability.   
4  How do capability traps emerge and endure? A framework 
To better understand and respond to this ‘capability trap’—countries progressing at a 
very slow pace in the expansion of state capability even in the contemporary world—we 
need better conceptual models. That is, it is obvious that the development of high levels 
of state capability we observe today in the rich countries took millennia to evolve, and 
there are major debates about the factors that initiated this sustained rise (e.g., Tilly 
1990; Bayly 2004; Fukuyama 2011). But development thinking, following 
modernization theory, believed that once initiated and demonstrated as a possibility, 
high capability states would inevitably diffuse to all countries. Moreover, many 
countries are in capability trap in spite of both self-conscious efforts to accelerate 
modernization by domestic actors and wide scale (if not large) external assistance 
promoting development. 
How do countries remain mired in a capability trap? While there are obviously many 
deep, structural and inter-related causes (political, social, economic) of why countries 
fail, we are interested in how countries fail—that is, in the techniques that allow and 
facilitate state failure in a ‘modern’ world, including a modern world in which many 
agencies promote the expansion of state capability. One technique that facilitates 
persistent failure, we argue, is ‘isomorphic mimicry’: the ability of organizations to 
sustain legitimacy through the imitation of the forms of modern institutions but without 
functionality.17 Another is that external engagement can actively hinder the emergence 
of domestic, organically-evolved functional organizations by, paradoxically, pushing 
too hard too soon, thereby creating a situation we call pre-mature load bearing in which 
stresses exceed capability. To account for these factors, we need a basic theoretical 
framework.  
4.1  Agents, organizations, systems: a framework of isomorphic mimicry 
The dynamics of enacting a given project or policy can be construed as occurring within 
an ecological space comprising three constituent elements: agents (leaders, managers 
and front-line staff); organizations (firms, NGOs, line ministries); and systems (the 
broader administrative and political apparatus under whose jurisdiction the activity 
falls) (Figure 2).  
  
                                                 
 
17 This concept and term draws on scholarship from the sociology of organizations, which describes 
isomorphic mimicry as an organizational strategy and discuss the types of mimicry—mimetic, 
normative, and coercive—each of which is in play in development. The classic references are 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Powell and DiMaggio (1991), with an ever-mounting body of 
evidence and theory accumulating since (e.g., Mahoney and Thelen 2010).   
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Figure 2: Constituent elements of an ecology of implementation 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Pritchett et al. (2010). 
 
Such an ecological space is not static, but rather one that must engage with multiple, 
ongoing tensions (imperatives and incentives) that characterize this space and that either 
reward or inhibit innovation. Front-line workers, for example, have certain levels of 
training and experience (‘capacity’), but their professional energy can be expended in a 
range of activities from malfeasance to mere compliance with rules to working within 
the spirit of the rules to customize responses to the particular needs of clients. Similarly, 
the managers of front-line workers (‘leaders’) can use the resources and rents over 
which they have responsibility to further their own purposes (‘elite capture’) or to 
enhance broader wealth creation. For development to occur it is clearly preferable that 
such agents pursue the latter alternatives, but whether or not they do so is less a function 
of their individual talents and proclivities than the incentives they face and normative 
expectations that characterize their work environment.  
 
Agents work within organizations: governmental line ministries, parastatal 
organizations, NGOs, firms or international agencies. These organizations have actual 
or inferred administrative mandates to address particular sectoral issues, but the 
legitimacy of their actions—which often entail making hard trade-offs, bearing 
responsibility for controversial outcomes and continuing to function in difficult, 
uncertain or under-resourced circumstances—rests on two primary sources: (i) 
demonstrated accomplishment (credibility and confidence is earned through providing 
services in a minimally effective and equitable manner) and/or (ii) appeal to external 
policies and programmes that have been deemed to work elsewhere (‘we can 
legitimately perform this complex task in this way in this place because it seems to have  
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achieved the desired result ‘over there’; moreover, these international experts have even 
declared it a “global best practice”’).  
 
The actions of agents are fundamentally concerned with upholding the legitimacy of 
their organization, but it is thus crucial which form this legitimacy—demonstrated 
accomplishment or mimicry—takes. If their organization’s legitimacy stems from 
accomplishment, agents will face incentives that reward innovation and ‘bureaucratic 
entrepreneurial’ behaviour; if from mimicry, they will just follow the rules, even more 
so as conditions deteriorate and uncertainty rises. All this, of course, raises the question 
of the conditions under which a given organization’s legitimacy stems from 
accomplishment or mimicry. Our framework points to broader system characteristics, in 
particular the proclivity of the system to require, recognize and reward novelty.
18  
 
In a canonical open market system, for example, effective regulation and the quest for 
profit maximization does all three: it requires novelty (to develop superior products and 
services); it recognizes novelty (i.e., is able to distinguish genuine from trivial 
innovation); and it rewards it (via compensation, prestige, promotion). Under the worst 
forms of socialism, at the other extreme, novelty was actively suppressed, with 
constituent organizations and agents acting almost entirely to uphold rules (at best), and 
dealing with contingencies by creating yet more rules.
19 Agents pretended to work and 
organizations pretended to pay them because that is what the system’s characteristics 
decreed. It could perform certain tasks for a short time period, but was utterly inflexible. 
 
Understood as a process of sustaining processes of genuine innovation, development is 
about moving the ecological equilibrium from the left to the right in Figure 2. Put 
differently, ‘modernization’ that works is an ongoing process of discovering and 
encouraging which of the diverse context-specific institutional forms will lead to higher 
functionality. Characteristically, however, responses to project/policy failure (or 
explanations of success, for that matter) focus only on individual elements of this 
ecology (capacity building for front-line staff, concern that ‘best practices’ are not being 
followed, etc.) that are ‘legible’ to and actionable by external actors; we argue that it is 
the broader fitness environment of this ecology for its constituent elements that 
primarily shapes observed outcomes. 
4.2 Some  clarifications 
Some key clarifications are in order before proceeding further. First, in expressing deep 
concerns about the dangers of isomorphic mimicry (or what Evans 2004 calls 
‘institutional monocropping’) and its associated quest for ‘global best practice’ solutions 
to development problems, we stress again that certain types of problems can and should 
be addressed in this manner. If a cure for cancer or a low-cost procedure for desalinating 
                                                 
 
18 This discussion of ‘novelty’ and its evaluation draws again on sociologists of organization who 
discuss how organizations (as a particular system itself) balance the need for ‘confirmatory’ signals to 
generate organizational coherence and order with the need for ‘novelty’ and means of evaluating 
novelty (see Carlile and Lakhani 2007). 
19 This contrast is merely illustrative; for present purposes (and as we qualify in more detail below) we 
are not brazenly claiming that all development systems would work better if only they adopted market 
principles. The point is that system characteristics, of all kinds, shape the actions of organizations and 
agents.  
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water is ever invented, the more rapidly it can be made available to everyone, the better. 
Our concern, building on an earlier formulation (Pritchett and Woolcock 2004), is that 
for certain development problems the quest for the solution is itself the problem, and 
this is especially so in matters pertaining to political, legal and organizational reform, 
where combinations of high discretionary decision-making and numerous face-to-face 
transactions are required to craft supportable solutions (plural). 
 
Second, in stressing the virtues of ecological learning and of encouraging multiple paths 
to high institutional performance, we are pushing back against—though not failing to 
appreciate the importance of—the Weberian ideal of a professionalized bureaucracy as 
the preferred mode of delivering core services. If Weberian organizations underpin 
modern economic and political life in high-income countries, isn’t this the goal to which 
low-income countries should aspire, and move as quickly as possible? If we know what 
effective organizations look like—if they constitute, in effect, a ‘global best practice’—
isn’t it just efficient, even ethically desirable, to introduce them as soon as possible? Has 
anyone actually ‘developed’ without them?  
 
Our response to these concerns takes several forms. For starters, appearances can be 
deceiving. The education system in the Netherlands, for example, produces students 
who perform at (or slightly above) the OECD average, and from a distance the structure 
that presides over this may appear ‘Weberian’. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals a 
system that is in many respects qualitatively different to its counterparts elsewhere in 
Europe and North America, in that it essentially funds students to attend a school of 
their choosing. That is, Dutch education is not a large, centralized, service-providing 
line ministry as it is elsewhere in the OECD, but rather a flat organizational structure 
that funds a highly decentralized ecology of different educational organizations. For 
present purposes we make no normative judgment as to which system is ‘better’; our 
key point is that high standards of education demonstrably can be attained by a system 
that varies significantly from the canonical Weberian ideal.20 A similar argument 
emerges from a close examination of countries with high ‘governance’ scores (Andrews 
2008). Far from having identical Weberian characteristics, the administrative structures 
that underpin such countries instead exhibit an extraordinary variety of organization 
forms, some of them classically Weberian but many of them significantly different (e.g., 
the relationship between banks and states in Japan versus the United Kingdom). Again, 
we make this point not to attack Weberian structures per se or to axiomatically celebrate 
alternatives, but rather to stress that the Weberian ideal isn’t inherently the gold 
standard to which everyone should aspire and against which alternatives should be 
assessed. In short, a variety of organizational forms can deliver similar institutional 
performance levels, just as identical organizational forms (as in the colonial period) can 
give rise to diverse performance levels. Finally, even in the most celebrated cases of 
Weberian effectiveness, such as Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) (Johnson 1982), it is not clear that its effectiveness was achieved because of, or 
in spite of, its ‘Weberian-ness’. 
 
                                                 
 
20 How such a system emerged historically is crucial to understanding whether and how it can be 
adopted elsewhere. As such, even if the Dutch education system produced the highest achieving 
students in the world, it is far from clear that Chad and Uruguay could emulate it by importing its 
constituent  organizational structures. We recognize, however, that a state may have capability 
requirements that are adequate for one challenge but inadequate for another.   
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The more vexing questions which our framework must confront center on strategies for 
recognizing and rewarding innovation in organizations that have a ‘natural’ monopoly 
(for whatever reason). There should only be one police force, for example, so pressures 
that may facilitate innovation in competitive markets cannot really be harnessed; we 
don’t want rival police forces. Similarly, for relatively routine (though clearly 
important) activities such as issuing drivers licenses, there is likely to be a clear limit to 
how much innovation is actually desirable or possible. If the prevailing system works 
reasonably well, only the most marginal improvements need be sought. Another set of 
issues turn on the question of how to overcome the classic ‘Peter Principle’ problem: if 
organizations are inherently dysfunctional because (a) everyone rises to their level of 
incompetence and (b) promotion turns on achieving yesterday’s core objectives rather 
than envisioning and realizing tomorrow’s innovation, how can this logic be broken?  
 
Finally, our framework must illuminate how genuinely useful innovative can be more 
reliably distinguished in real time from innovation for its own sake or from merely 
imitating ‘best practice’. Personal computers, for example, completely altered the world 
of computing, replacing mainframes as the dominant way in which everyday computing 
was conducted. At the time (1980s) it was obvious that PCs were a decidedly inferior 
technology to the existing mainframes. As Christensen (1997) details, PCs were a 
disruptive innovation in that they were an inferior technology—one that was dismissed 
by engineers at the ‘best’ firms as a mere toy for hobbyists. But as the PC came to meet 
the actual functional objectives of the mass of users better than mainframes it was the 
‘excellent’ firms that were left by the wayside. Had the profession of computer 
engineering itself been in a position of choosing innovation, the PC could have never 
emerged—but markets had a space for novelty and a way of evaluating novelty so that 
consumers could vote with their keyboards (and dollars) for the new. Within 
development agencies, one hears frequent reference to the quest for ‘cutting edge 
thinking’ and the importance of taking ‘innovative approaches’, but how can such 
agencies enhance the likelihood that PCs, rather than just new-and-improved 
mainframes, will emerge? 
4.3  Responses to ecological failure 
Providing answers to these questions requires an examination of how responses to 
failure, as and when it occurs, are pursued within the prevailing development 
architecture. When policies or programmes fail because of implementation failure, there 
are many good bad response options: 
(a)  Adopt a ‘better’ policy. One obvious response to failure is to assume that the 
reason for failure was that the policy, even if it had been faithfully implemented, 
would not have accomplished the objective anyway and hence failure requires a 
new policy. However, even if the new policy is demonstrably  better—in the 
sense that when implemented it leads to better outcomes—if it is equally (or 
more) organizationally stress-inducing in implementation, this will lead, after a 
number of intervening years, to further failure.  
(b)  Engage in ‘capacity building’. One attractive and obvious response to policy 
implementation failure is to assume that the problem was that the 
individual implementing agents lacked ‘capacity’, in the sense that they could 
not have implemented the policy even had they wanted to. This is nearly always  
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plausible, as policy implementation requires agents to successfully recognize 
states of the world and know what to do in each instance (e.g., a nurse mandated 
to do community nutrition outreach has to be able to recognize a variety of 
symptoms and know which to treat, which to inform parents about how they 
should respond, which to refer, etc.). What could be a more obvious response of 
public sector failure in sector X (health, education, procurement, policing, 
regulation, justice) than to ‘train’ health workers, teachers, procurement officers, 
policemen, regulators, lawyers—particularly as it will be demonstrably the case 
that ‘ideal capability’ (i.e., the organizational capability if all individuals worked 
to capacity) is low?21 However, if the organization is under excessive stress due 
to the attempt to implement over-ambitious policies, the achievable increments 
to ideal capability may neither (i) augment the ‘robustness’ of the organization 
and hence be irrelevant in practice, nor (ii) shift the entire capacity frontier 
outward far enough to actually avoid the low level equilibrium. (In Figure 2 even 
substantial outward shifts in the ‘low’ capability case would still lead to the 
equilibrium of zero implementation.)  
(c)  Cocoon particular projects/programmes/sectors. Another reaction to 
implementation failure, particularly when external assistance agencies (whether 
donors or NGOs) are involved, is to ensure ‘their’ project succeeds in a low 
capability environment by creating parallel systems. These parallel systems 
come in many varieties, from project implementation units to ‘bottom up’ 
channels in which funds are channeled directly to ‘communities’. The common 
difficulty with cocooning is that there is often no coherent plan as to how the 
cocooned success will scale to become (or replace) the routine practice. In fact, 
the cocooned implementation modes are often so resource intensive (in either 
scarce human capital resources ‘donated’ by NGOs or financial resources) that 
they are not scalable. Again, cocooning is a valuable technique of persistent 
failure as one can have long strings of demonstrably successful projects while a 
sector itself never improves.  
(d)  Throw more resources into it. It is easy to see how ‘isomorphic mimicry’ and 
premature load bearing make a powerful partnership. When governments are 
carrying out necessary and desirable goals (e.g., building roads, educating 
children, maintaining law and order) and are doing so by pursuing demonstrably 
successful policies (that is, policies whose effectiveness as a mapping from 
inputs to outcomes has been shown to achieve results when implemented) and 
are doing so through isomorphic organizational structures (e.g., police forces or 
education ministries whose organizational charts and de jure operational 
manuals are identical to those in functional countries) then doubling down the 
bet seems the only viable strategy. After all, this is known to work: it works in 
Denmark. Because most places with low state capability also have low 
productivity and hence governments are working with few resources, it is hard to 
not believe that simply applying more resources to achieve good goals by 
implementing good policies through good organizations is not the obvious, if not 
only, strategy.  
 
                                                 
 
21 Moreover, as the development saying goes, ‘A project that gives a man a fish feeds him for a day, but 
a project to teach a man to fish lets you give your friend the technical assistance contract’.  
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Not only are there many good bad response options but some potentially good options 
are bad options, on the part of both clients and donors.22 
 
•  Scaling policies to the available implementation capability is often 
professionally and normatively unattractive.   
•  Expanding capability in ways that are perhaps more ‘robust’ but which do not 
expand the ‘ideal’ are often decidedly unattractive to development actors who 
prefer options that are ‘modern’ and technically state-of-the-art.   
•  Attacking organizational failure is unattractive, as once an organization’s goals 
have been inverted to rent collection these are often subsequently capitalized 
into the political system in ways that eliminate potential constituencies for 
organizational ‘reform’. 
As techniques that can both produce and allow persistent failure, the dangers of 
‘isomorphic mimicry’ and ‘premature load bearing’ are pervasive precisely because 
they are attractive to domestic reformers. But paradoxically, external agents, whose 
presence is justified by the need to promote (and fund) progress, also play a strong role 
in generating and sustaining failure. Development agencies, both multi-lateral and bi-
lateral, have very strong proclivities towards promoting isomorphic mimicry—e.g., 
encouraging governments to adopt the right policies and organization charts and to 
pursue ‘best practice’ reforms—without actually creating the conditions in which true 
novelty can emerge, be evaluated, and scaled. It is much more attractive for donors to 
measure their success as either inputs provided, training sessions held, or ‘reforms’ 
undertaken and in process-compliance in project implementation; all of these are 
laudable activities that can be readily justified and attractively presented at year’s end, 
yet can lead to zero actual improvement in a system’s demonstrated performance.  
4.4 Alternatives 
Even so, more and more people now recognize that the problem of aid effectiveness is 
not a problem that can be solved without a new ‘theory of change’. One such example is 
a new form of foreign aid, ‘Cash on Delivery’ (Birdsall and Savedoff 2010), in which, 
instead of donors delivering inputs into pre-specified projects in accordance with 
predetermined ‘conditions’, donors and countries would agree on a set of performance 
targets; countries would then be allowed to pursue the target in any way they chose, 
with financial support following demonstrated success (and verification by a third 
party). This is a bold attempt to stand isomorphic mimicry on its head. In order to 
implement COD aid there has to be a goal, and progress against the goal has to be 
measured at the system level (not just ‘evaluating’ the project). This already is a huge 
improvement over a great deal of external assistance, as it pushes the system away from 
isomorphic mimicry towards the conditions in which innovation, including ‘disruptive’ 
innovation, is possible. While the current fad in development projects is towards more 
                                                 
 
22 In separate work, Pritchett (2011) documents empirical instances of complete (and persistent) 
organizational dysfunction, drawing on research in a variety of sectors from health to education to the 
simple task of giving driver’s licenses. See also Banerjee et al. (2008), who demonstrate the resilience 
of deep organizational failure in attempts to enhance the performance of nurses in Rajasthan. What is 
striking about these examples is that they all come from India, which is, on average across the four 
indicators we use of ‘state capability’, in the upper tier of developing countries.  
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rigorous measurement of project outputs and rigorous output evaluation of the project 
itself, there is no attention to creating an overall measure of progress against which all 
novelty can be assessed, and hence no positive theory of how this information about 
project performance would lead organizations to adopt new ideas at scale.23 It remains 
to be seen whether COD aid can overcome the organizational risk aversion of external 
actors who prefer to disburse against ‘best practice’ rather than risk being perceived as 
having supported failure.   
5 Conclusion 
There are multiple dimensions to ‘development’, one of which is the acquisition of 
administrative capability, which in the standard characterization of the modernization 
process is the acquisition of state capability. As documented above, however, even at 
the most optimistically estimated long-run pace, many countries will take centuries (if 
not millennia) to teach high levels of state capability. Our concern in this paper has been 
with explaining how (as opposed to why) developing countries and international 
agencies sustain a dynamic enabling both parties to engage in the business of reform 
while rarely actually achieving it. How do governments manage to persistently fail to 
acquire the capability to implement while at the same time engage for decades in the 
domestic and international logics of development and its rhetoric of ‘progress’?  
 
We propose two techniques that enable countries to succeed at failing. The first 
technique is isomorphic mimicry, which allows organizations (and states) to maintain 
legitimacy by adopting the forms of successful organizations and states even without 
their functions. Societal structures and institutional imperatives can create an ecosystem 
in which isomorphic mimicry is actually the optimal strategy for state organizations 
and, by extension, their leaders and managers. The second technique is premature load 
bearing, which  allows failure to exist while creating the illusion of implementing 
developmental policies; it proves a robust technique of failure by providing many 
seemingly attractive options that nonetheless allow failure to continue.   
 
This analysis gives rise to a policy research agenda focused on better understanding the 
conditions under which political space is created for nurturing the endogenous learning 
and indigenous debate necessary to create context-specific institutions and incremental 
reform processes.24 For development agencies, particularly external agencies, the key 
questions should focus on how they can facilitate such processes, and resist their own 
internal imperatives to perpetuate isomorphic mimicry in those sectors (especially 
political and legal reform) where imported ‘blueprints’ are themselves too often part of 
the problem. More generally, a key challenge emerging from this analysis is how 
partnerships between international and domestic agencies can set and support—and 
meaningfully assess progress towards—realistic expectations regarding overall 
organizational performance. If the goal of development is ultimately one of building 
institutional (and especially state) capability, and of facilitating ecological-level 
                                                 
 
23 For this argument in the domain of schooling—i.e., that ‘knowledge’ of the type that ‘randomized 
evaluations’ of individual projects could produce is not embedded in a realistic positive model of 
change—see Pritchett (2009).  
24 Further details on the contours of an evolving policy research agenda consistent with the above 
analysis are provided in Pritchett and de Weijer (2010) and Andrews et al. (2012).  
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learning, then the key issue for researchers is less discovering which individual 
development projects ‘work’ (as important as this is on its own terms) and more one of 
contributing to an alternative theory of change, one that forges a ‘middle way’ between 
the virtues and limits of both Big and Small Development—that is, supports the 
emergence of platforms (such as ‘Cash on Delivery’ Aid) that are simultaneously 
capable of effecting systemic change, at scale, while retaining flexibility and 
adaptability in the face of contextual idiosyncrasies and in response to local 
accountability norms. 
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